Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. £37.00 (hardback). And if moral facts exist, … Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist:to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts do exist. The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. But epistemic facts do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological scepticism. The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar so that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological scepticism.

Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. Terence Cuneo argues that moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar so that, if moral facts do … Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. FREE shipping to most Australian states. The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument. The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism Published: June 23, 2008 Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism , Oxford University Press, 2007, 263pp., $75.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199218837.

Terence Cuneo argues that moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar so that, if moral facts do … Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts do exist. Terence Cuneo argues that moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar so that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. 260. The Normative Web 9780199581382 by Cuneo, Terence; Cuneo, Terence. Publisher: Oxford University Press UK. The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Keith DeRose - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):1-5. ISBN 978-0-19-921883-7.

And if moral facts exist, … The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism, by Terence Cuneo. The Normative Web is an important book, if for no other reason than it does something that is unfortunately all too rare in contemporary metaethics: it presents a very … The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist.

The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Thirty years separate The Normative Web from Mackie‘s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, and the celebrated ‗argument from queerness‘ that helped push moral realism onto the defensive (Mackie 1977, pp. 38-42). Terence Cuneo argues that moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar so that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist.